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Abstract
This paper investigates the e®ects of monetary policy over banks' loans
growth and non-performing loans for the recent period in Brazil. We con-
tribute to the literature on bank lending and risk taking channel by show-
ing that during periods of loosening/tightening monetary policy, banks in-
crease/decrease their loans. Moreover, our results illustrate that large, well-
capitalized and liquid banks absorb better the e®ects of monetary policy
shocks. We also ¯nd that low interest rates lead to an increase in credit
risk exposure, supporting the existence of a risk-taking channel. Finally, we
show that the impact of monetary policy di®ers across state-owned, foreign
and private domestic banks. These results are important for developing and
conducting monetary policy.
Key Words: Monetary policy; Loan growth; Non-performing loans; Own-
ership control.
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In 2008, a series of large ¯nancial institutions around the world collapsed
or failed, resulting in the need for government intervention. The crisis has
shown that banking system losses can lead to tightening credit conditions
among with economic costs. The ¯nancial crisis halted global credit mar-
kets, jeopardizing the ¯nancial stability of the economy worldwide. Brazil
was no exception. However, even though a®ected by the crisis, Brazil reacted
more e®ectively than other countries because it had less ¯nancial vulnera-
bility and counted with proactive regulation and supervision of its ¯nancial
market. The monetary policy was crucial for the good development of Brazil
during the ¯nancial crisis. Furthermore, the role of central banks in conduct-
ing monetary policy to help equalize the adverse consequences of ¯nancial
instability on the real sector of the economy was intensi¯ed. In this con-
text, this paper intends to discuss the role of monetary policy in creating
an environment of ¯nancial stability, de¯ned by Schinasi [2004] in terms of
its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks, and
absorb shocks.
There are two main important views of the relationship between monetary
policy and ¯nancial stability. The ¯rst one a±rms that there are synergies in
this relationship [Schwart, 1995, Bernanke and Gertler, 1999]. Stable prices
create an environment of predictable interest rates, conducting to a lower
risk of interest rate mismatches, which reduces, in the long-term, the in-
°ation risk premium and contributes to ¯nancial stability [Schwart, 1995].
Therefore, monetary policy should be used to enhance price stability and
¯nancial stability [Herrero and Lopez, 2003]. Padoa-Schioppa [2002] and
Haugland and Vikoren [2006] agree that there are synergies between price
stability and ¯nancial stability, but only in the longer term, suggesting that
there is no guarantee that monetary policy will be su±cient to prevent ¯-
nancial instability. In this case, a situation of low in°ation may conduct
to a negative e®ect on bank's balance sheets [Fisher, 1933, Graeve et al.,
2008]. On the other hand, the other view sustains the idea of a trade-o® be-
tween monetary policy and ¯nancial stability [Mishkin, 1997, Graeve et al.,
2008]. Graeve et al. [2008] show that an unexpected tightening of monetary
policy increases the probability of bank distress. In particular, the e®ect
of monetary policy shocks on ¯nancial stability is larger in banks with low
capitalization.
Understanding the transmission channels that exist between the ¯nancial
4and the real sectors of the economy is crucial when analyzing ¯nancial sta-
bility. This paper brings out the discussion of two channels in Brazil, the
bank lending channel and the risk taking channel. It is quite an agreement
that the bank lending channel acts through the impact of monetary policy
over deposits. According to ? monetary policy tightening leads to a fall in
deposits which induces banks to substitute towards more expensive forms
of market funding, contracting loan supply. This happens when banks face
frictions in issuing uninsured liabilities to replace the shortfall in deposits. In
accordance, after studying more than 600 banks from 32 countries, Nier and
Zicchino [2008] veri¯ed that tightening/loosing monetary policy is associated
with loan decrease/increase. Disyatat [2010], on the other hand, argues that
the emphasis on policy-induced changes in deposits is misplaced. A refor-
mulation of the bank lending channel is proposed, in which monetary policy
impacts primarily banks' balance sheet strength and risk perception.
Recently, monetary policy and ¯nancial stability issues have become very
intertwined, which has encouraged studies concerning the bank lending chan-
nel. In their pioneering work, Kashyap and Stein [1995] use US banks to
attest that under monetary policy tightening, smaller banks reduce a larger
amount of loans compared to larger banks. Gambacorta [2005], in contrast,
shows in a study of Italy that bank size seems to be irrelevant; small banks
are not more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than large banks. More-
over, Kashyap and Stein [2000] and Bayoumi and Melander [2008] a±rm that
bank's balance sheets have a signi¯cant e®ect on credit availability. Banks
with less liquid balance sheet, that is, banks with lower ratios of securities to
assets, su®er a stronger impact on lending from monetary policy. ? studied
the US banks and found that during periods of monetary policy tightening
banks with less capital reduce loans. In theory, the only banks that raise
loan rates substantially in response to an increase in the federal funds are
the ones that present a high proportion of relationship loans that are close
to a loan-to-core deposit ratio of one [Black et al., 2007].
Altunbas et al. [2002], Francis and Osborne [2009a] and Gambacorta
and Mistrulli [2004] found that better capitalized banks experience less pro-
nounced impacts on their lending. This might happen because well-capitalized
banks have easier access to non-deposit fund-raising [Gambacorta and Mis-
trulli, 2004] or because with capital adjustment costs, higher capital require-
ments reduce a bank's optimal loan growth [Francis and Osborne, 2009a].
The use of securitization also protects bank's loan supply from the e®ects
of monetary policy and additionally increases the grant of loans [Altunbas
5et al., 2009a]. However, attention is needed when increasing the lending stan-
dards, since it can cause negative e®ect on lending and on economic activity
[Berrospide and Edge, 2008]. Altunbas et al. [2009b] found out that banks
with a lower expected default frequency not only can o®er a higher amount
of credit but also can protect better their loan supply from monetary policy
changes.
The ¯nancial crisis arose the discussion concerning the existence of a
risk taking channel, characterized by changes in banks' risk tolerance due to
expansive monetary policy. During the crisis, many central banks reduced
interest rates in order to avoid recession. Brazil's interest rates were reduced
to historical levels. Altunbas et al. [2009c] show in their work that unusually
low interest rates lead to an increase in banks' risk taking. In particular,
this e®ect is more pronounced in the medium term due to higher collateral
value and the search for yield [Jimenez et al., 2007]. Moreover, Ioannidou
et al. [2009] analyze Bolivia between 1999 and 2003 in the context of a quasi-
natural experiment and found that during periods of low interest rates, banks
not only increase risky loans but also reduce the rates charged to riskier
borrowers. In addition, larger banks, with less capital and more liquid assets
take on more risk when interest rates are lower. In a further work, ? show
the e®ect of deposit insurance on risk-taking, revealing that banks present
a higher probability of initiating riskier loans in the post-deposit insurance
period. Nevertheless, the raise in risk-taking is a result of the decrease in
market discipline from large depositors. In light of these recent developments,
the liquidity channel is important for determining banks' ability to extend
credit. The literature attests that the propagation of funding liquidity shocks
to bank lending is due to high leverage ratios, large maturity mismatches in
banks balance sheet [Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007] and mark-to-market
accounting [Cifuentes et al., 2005].
However, there is a scarce number of studies relating to developing coun-
tries. This paper intends to contribute to the literature by analyzing the
case of Brazil, a developing economy. In this concern, Francis and Osborne
[2009b] have shown that emerging market authorities have retained signif-
icant monetary control after the recent liberalization of ¯nancial markets.
However, local monetary policy does not have a signi¯cant e®ect on emerg-
ing stock markets. In particular, Gunji and Yuan [2010] studied the case of
China, suggesting that larger banks, banks with lower levels of liquidity and
pro¯table banks su®er a less pronounced e®ect of monetary policy over their
lending activity.
6We report banks's speci¯c characteristics and ownership control in order
to verify if there is a bank lending and risk taking channel operating in
Brazil. ? a±rm that for a good comprehension of Latin American banks
performance it is necessary to evaluate the degree of capitalization and the
banks' size. Those characteristics were included in our study, along with
liquidity. Additionally, we show that monetary policy has di®erent e®ects on
banks with di®erent ownership. This may be due to the fact that state-owned,
foreign and private domestic banks have di®erent goals and strategies and
may have di®erent funding sources, either domestically or abroad. Recent
research has found that banks with di®erent ownership may have di®erent
bank technology and e±ciency [Staub et al., 2010]. Therefore, the empirical
evidence presented in this paper is in line with a di®erent impact to monetary
policy for state-owned, foreign and private domestic banks.
Our sample consists of a high frequency panel data, with 5183 observa-
tions for the period 2003-2009. The main results of our study are as fol-
lows. First, we show the existence of a bank lending channel by showing
that during periods of monetary tightening/loosing, banks have their loans
decreased/increased. Moreover, larger, well capitalized and liquid banks ex-
pand more their loan portfolio. We show that the ¯nancial crisis has had a
large impact on lending activity. We ¯nd that state-owned banks seem to
respond more to monetary policy changes than foreign and private banks.
Second, by analyzing the impacts of monetary policy over non-performing
loans, we ¯nd that during periods of interest rates increase/decrease, banks
present a higher/lower growth rate of NPL, which may aggravate/alleviate
their performance. In addition, state-owned banks have a di®erent lending
pro¯le, since they present a lower amount of non-performing loans. Finally,
our results also support the existence of a risk taking channel, in which lower
monetary policy rates increase the banks' risk-taking. During periods of low
interest rates, large and liquid banks increase their credit risk exposure.
These ¯ndings should be taken into account when managing monetary
policy. Policymakers must be aware of the possible implication of their ac-
tions on banks' incentives. And, more precisely, attention should be paid
during periods of unusually low interest rates which may signal an increase
in risk-taking. Therefore, central banks should have caution when conduct-
ing monetary policy. The bene¯ts of the central bank independence are quite
a consensus not only for aiming price stability but also for maintaining ¯nan-
cial stability [Shiratsuka, 2001, Herrero and Lopez, 2003, Klomp and Haan,
2009, Smaghi, 2008]. However, Greenspan [2005] recommends that monetary
7policy should only be used as a reactive instrument to alleviate the e®ects of
a ¯nancial crisis and not as an instrument to prevent it.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the empirical methodology adopted. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4
describes the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes our work.
2 A Brief Review of the Brazilian Banking
System
The Brazilian banking system consists of state-owned, foreign and private do-
mestic banks. However, there are several di®erences among asset structures
of the various banking segments. State-owned banks, with the exception of
the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES), had the
lowest proportion of assets invested in loan operations in 2007. Meanwhile,
these banks also had the largest volume of Stocks and Securities (TVMs).
Since 2004, investments of state-owned banks were in a certain way concen-
trated in TVM, particularly in papers held to maturity. This is due to high
interest rates and large pro¯ts that stem from these operations with low risk.
Private banks, on the other hand, are characterized by presenting the largest
volume of interbank liquidity investments, accompanying the tendency of
making greater use of funding through repo operations and permanent as-
sets, due to investments in stockholding positions. Foreign institutions, in
the recent period, presented a greater use of other common assets, particu-
larly derivatives. This could be due to hedging purposes as some of these
institutions are specialized in intermediating external funding operations for
domestic clients in Brazil.
In 2008 state-owned banks had the highest margin requirements compared
to other institutions. In the ¯rst semester of 2008, the Required Base Capital
(PRE) of private domestic banks and foreign banks were, respectively, 15.2%
and 11.7%, while state-owned banks led the way with 18.2%. Compared to
private banks, the di®erence in the pace of growth of state-owned banks is
illustrated mainly by the reduction in the representativeness of state-owned
banks in Total Consolidated Assets, which dropped to 33.9% in 2008 x.
The credit expansion has made the monitoring of default and capital-
ization levels of ¯nancial institutions become more important. The level of
xBrazilian Central Bank Financial Stability Report - 2008, 2009
8default dropped from 6.9% in 2003 to 3.2% in 2007. Despite the reduction
in leverage, state-owned banks continued making intensive use of third-party
capital, especially through subordinate debt. Credit assigns{ have been an-
other important source of ¯nancing, particularly to smaller scale banks. In
the recent period, private banks have hold the largest volume of liabilities
for repo operations. Foreign banks have made greater utilization of time
deposits and liabilities for loans and on lending operations, as state-owned
banks have become known for saving deposits.
Since 2003, the participation in credit operations by state-owned banks
has been increasing. In December of 2003, the participation of state-owned
banks grew on 9%, while the participation of national private banks and for-
eign banks grew on 6.6% and 4%, respectively. In 2010, state-owned banks
were ahead of private banks in lending activity, representing 41.7% of total
credit in the ¯nancial system. Private banks were responsible for 40.5%,
due to an increase in non-earmarked lending to individuals and corporations,
while foreign banks represented 17.8% of the ¯nancial system. Moreover,
state-owned banks led the way in credit with earmarked resources; these
banks have increased 52.9% in credit to housing and 32.4% in credit to indi-
viduals compared to the same period in 2009.
The Brazilian economy was negatively a®ected by the worsening of the
world economic crisis since September 2008, after the failure of Lehmam
Brothers. Financing conditions for ¯rms and banks deteriorated and only
began to improve in the second semester of 2009. The government imple-
mented monetary, ¯scal and credit stimuli through 2009 to help accelerate
the recovery of the economy. In particular, a quantitative easing was un-
dertaken by the central bank due to a cool o® of in°ation pressures in light
of the large contraction of domestic demand. This quantitative easing has
helped to normalize credit conditions.
With the disorder triggered by the mortgage market crisis, national ¯nan-
cial market indicators presented some kind of resilience. As a result, investors
were favorable on bringing their money to Brazil, a distinguished emerging
economy. However, domestic indicators became more volatile, especially in
what concerns interest rates and stock markets. The growing dynamics of
domestic demand presented signi¯cant increases in investment levels and in
expanding household consumption. Although credit supply (% GDP) has
{joint liabilities assumed in assigns, securitization of credit or negotiation of certi¯cates
or bank credit to corporate ¯nancial entities and individuals.
9reached high historical levels in the recent past, it is still relatively low if
compared to other countries. The considerable con¯dence of consumers and
Brazilian businessmen in the market led to an increasing in the average matu-
rity of loans, which can be used as a proxy for measuring risk. Consequently,
credit growth in Brazil has in no way jeopardized ¯nancial system solidity.
As a matter of fact, at the end of 2008, there was a continuous credit ex-
pansion, with low default level and a consistently greater level of provisions
than any expected losses.
The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) has adopted some measures in or-
der to avoid the crisis and solve the liquidity problem. During the second
semester of 2008, there have been several auctions of dollars with the at-
tempt to buy it back in the future, as well as auctions of loan reserve and
currency swap contracts. Those sells represent signs of liquidity supply in
the short-term. Additionally, the resources allow banks to ¯nance Brazilian
exports. The BCB not only released R$ 13,2 billions to the ¯nancial market
as additional compulsory as well as changed several rules of the compul-
sory reserve. The measures were applied to preserve the national ¯nancial
system from the liquidity restriction e®ects that have been observed in the
international ¯nancial system. By the end of October, there was a currency
trade agreement between BCB and FED in the value of US$ 30 billions. In
order to assure liquidity in the national market, BCB released compulsory
reserves, changed several rules in rediscount operations and in the Credit
Guarantee Fund (FGC). By the end of 2008, the credit rules were softened
and there was a reduction of the tax on ¯nancial transactions (IOF). In order
to maintain credit expansion, in the beginning of 2009 it was implemented an
employment guarantee, a housing plan and a tax waiver package in the at-
tempt of preventing Brazil from falling into recession. Those measures made
it possible to alleviate the liquidity problem as well as enhanced the credit
activity.
We test for the impacts of monetary policy over state-owned, foreign
and private domestic banks. Since they present di®erent characteristics and
di®erent strategies, we expect to ¯nd di®erent reactions to interest rates
changes from each bank segment in what concerns lending and credit risk
exposure. These results are important to assess the di®erent impacts of
monetary policy on the banking system.
103 Methodology
The empirical speci¯cation is designed to test the relationship between mon-
etary policy and ¯nancial stability. We search for evidences that suggest the
existence of a bank lending channel and a risk taking channel in Brazil. We
also shed light on the di®erent impacts of monetary policy over state-owned,
foreign and private banks. To do so, we test the impact of monetary policy
over loan growth, NPL and a credit risk exposure measure. We employ the
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation to test our hypothe-
sis, in which there is ¯rst-order correlation within units as well as correlation
and heteroscedasticity across units. The Modi¯ed Wald test is presented in
order to attest if the model is well speci¯ed, as proposes ?.
It is worth mentioning that most of our regressions are based on dynamic
panel data model speci¯cations. We also know that dynamical panels with
small time dimension estimated using FGLS may be severely biased. How-
ever, since both the number of banks and the size of the sample are long, in
our case, this bias may be neglected [?]. Avoiding the usual procedure based
on di®erence and system generalized method of moments (some variation of
the Arellano and Bond [1991] estimator), we also circumvent the problem
of too many instruments [?] that could arise in our study due to the large
sample period.
It is di±cult to separate and distinguish supply from demand factors us-
ing aggregate data. Empirically, it is not clear to attest whether the e®ects
of banks conditions are a®ecting the demand or the supply side. In order
to solve this identi¯cation problem we include in our speci¯cation the indus-
trial production to control for aggregate loan demand, as suggests Nier and
Zicchino [2008]. This variable enables to account for di®erences in the time
pro¯le of loan demand as well as relieve identi¯cation of bank loan supply.
Considering the supply side, Kashyap and Stein [2000] propose to examine
lending behavior at the individual bank level. That is why we have incorpo-
rated variables for bank-speci¯c characteristics, such as size, capitalization
and liquidity.
3.1 Bank Lending Channel
The bank lending channel acts through the impact of monetary policy over
deposits, and therefore lending. During monetary tightening deposits fall,
forcing banks to opt for more expensive forms of market funding, contracting
11loan supply [Disyatat, 2010]. Changes in deposits are seen to drive bank
loans. The opposite is also valid, when interest rates decrease, both deposits
and lending increase [Altunbas et al., 2009c].
We test if there is a bank lending channel in Brazil by analyzing the
relationship between monetary policy changes and loan growth. ? sustain
that there are two bank's speci¯c factors that are particularly important in
explaining Latin American banks performance: the degree of capitalization
and banks' size. We include these variables in our speci¯cation, along with
liquidity. Moreover, we test interactions of loans with bank's speci¯c char-
acteristics (Size, Capitalization and Liquidity) in order to verify if they are
in accordance with the bank lending channel literature. In addition, we test
the di®erent reactions of state-owned, foreign and private domestic banks
to interest rates (Selic) changes. In order to verify this relation we include
two dummies: State ¡ Owned and Foreign. They represent, respectively,
state-owned banks and foreign banks. We expected to ¯nd di®erent e®ects.
State-owned and foreign banks di®er in several ways. Staub et al. [2010]
show that foreign banks have improved their performance in what concerns
the establishment of new a±liates and the acquisition of local banks. On the
other hand, despite having improved cost e±ciency, state-owned banks are
pro¯t ine±cient.
We take into consideration in our empirical analysis the impact of the
2008 ¯nancial crisis. The Brazilian economy was negatively a®ected by the
worsening of the world economic crisis since September 2008, after the failure
of Lehmam Brothers. In order to capture this e®ect we introduce a dummy
crisis, Crisis. Moreover, we test if the the bank lending channel is more
pronounced during the crisis period by adding some interactions with Crisis.
The benchmark equation is presented as follows:
¢Loansit = ®¢Loansi;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (1)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + '¢Selict¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½¢Selict¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
where ¢Loans is the variation of bank's loan growth of bank i, Size is the
12log of the total assets of bank i at time t ¡ 1, Cap stands for capitaliza-
tion, measured by the equity ratio over assets, Liq represents liquidity and
is measured by deposits over loans, ¢Selic is the Banco Central do Brasil's
overnight lending yoy (year over year), DummyOwnership represents the
dummies for State ¡ Owned and Foreign banks, Crisisi;t is the dummy
for crisis period that starts in September of 2008, and "i;t is the error. All
variables are presented in natural logarithm.
We also estimate the growth rate of loans in periods of monetary con-
traction and expansion using two dummies Up and Down. They represent,
respectively, upward and downward movements in the Selic interest rates. We
interact these dummies with banks' characteristics (size, capitalization and
liquidity), ownership control, and the dummy for crisis. We verify wether
the loan growth supply di®ers for these banks for di®erent periods in the
monetary cycle. The speci¯cation to be tested is given by:
¢Loansit = ®¢Loansi;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (2)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + 'Dummyt¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½Dummyt¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
where Dummy represents the monetary policy dummies. We expect the Up
coe±cient to be negative, i.e., when interest rates increase, banks reduce their
lending activity. On the other hand, the Down coe±cient is expected to be
positive, i.e., decreases in the interest rates lead to increases in bank's lending
activity. Furthermore, we expect the coe±cients for Size, Capitalization
and Liquidity to be positive, in accordance with the bank lending channel
literature.
In order to verify the consistence of our results, we test the same regression
of Equation (1) and (2) but now using the mean of the independent variables
for each year. Therefore we can analyze the e®ects of monetary policy over
the year and compare with the results for each month observation.
133.2 Risk-Taking Channel
3.2.1 Non-Performing Loans
We also analyze the e®ects of monetary policy on non-performing loans
(NPL). Ideally, we would like to employ market-risk based indicators for
banks risk. However, such database is not available for a long time period
and a large sample of banks. Therefore, we employ accounting-based risk
measures. A few authors [Altunbas et al., 2009b,c,a] have used the EDF as a
measure of risk-taking. An underlying assumption in the use of this variable
is that changes in EDF re°ect a change in the bank risk taking, which may
not hold. Specially in crisis periods. If a major global shock hits the economy
we should expect these EDF measures to re°ect an increase in risk-taking in
accordance to investors expectations which may or may not re°ect the true
banks risk taking. In Brazil, traditionally banks invest in safe ¯xed income
securities (TVM) with low risk such as government bonds, which pay a high
interest rate and perform credit operations. An increase in their risk-taking
can be capture by measuring the higher proportion of loans of total assets
they hold. Therefore, we believe that this variable may capture better the
Brazilian banks risk taking.
We also used the ownership control in order to test whether the e®ects of
monetary policy di®ers for these banks. We include the State ¡ Owned and
Foreign dummies in order to verify which bank has a higher credit exposure.
Again, we expect the e®ects not to be the same due to di®erent strategies
that these banks present. Once more, the bank's speci¯c characteristics
were included as well as the dummy for Crisis. The benchmark equation is
presented as follows:
¢NPLit = ®¢NPLi;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (3)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + '¢Selict¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½¢Selict¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
where ¢NPL is the variation of bank's Non-performing loans divided by
Loans of bank i at time t.
14We test how monetary policy changes a®ect the non-performing loans
(NPL) by introducing monetary policy dummies (Up and Down). We want
to check if banks increase/decrease their exposure in accordance with the
direction of monetary policy. The equation is represented as follows:
¢NPLit = ®¢NPLi;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (4)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + 'Dummyt¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½Dummyt¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
We expect to ¯nd a positive coe±cient for the Up dummy, suggesting
that when interest rate increase non-performing loans increase. In contrast,
we expect to ¯nd a negative sign for the Down coe±cient, suggesting that
when interest rate decrease non-performing loans decrease.
In order to verify the consistence of our results, we test the same regression
of Equation (3) and (4) but now using the mean of the independent variables
for each year. Therefore we can analyze the e®ects of monetary policy over
the year and compare with the results for each month observation.
3.2.2 Credit Risk Exposure
During the ¯nancial crisis, Brazil's interest rates reached low historical values.
Altunbas et al. [2009c] show in their work that unusually low interest rates
leads to an increase in banks' risk taking. Moreover, this e®ect is more
pronounced in medium term due to higher collateral value and the search for
yield [Jimenez et al., 2007]. This period of low interest rates may encourage
banks to soften their lending standards and increase the participation of
risky new loans [Jimenez et al., 2007]. Ioannidou et al. [2009] shows that
during periods of low interest rates, banks not only increase risky loans but
also reduce the rates charged to riskier borrowers. In addition, larger banks,
with less capital and more liquid assets take on more risk when interest rates
are lower. Our paper brings more discussion to this issue by including the
interaction between Size and Selic in order to test whether small or large
15banks are the ones that present a higher credit risk exposure. In addition,
we reveal the role of the ownership control. Although the participation of
foreign banks has been increasing, the share of state-owned banks is high
[Staub et al., 2010]. The benchmark equation is presented as follows:
¢Riskit = ®¢Riski;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (5)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + '¢Selict¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½¢Selict¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
where ¢Risk is the ratio between total Loans and total Assets of bank i at
time t.
We want to test the e®ects of monetary policy changes on credit risk
exposure, in order to analyze if there is a risk taking channel acting in Brazil's
economy. If there is a risk taking channel, low interest rates will induce to a
higher risk exposure, increasing loans. To test our hypothesis we include the
monetary policy dummies (Up and Down). The equation is determined as:
¢Riskit = ®¢Riski;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (6)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + 'Dummyt¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½Dummyt¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
We expect the Ã coe±cient to be positive when the dummy Down is
included, since it implies that decreases in interest rates increase credit risk
exposure. In addition, we expect to ¯nd a signi¯cant coe±cient of the inter-
actions between Selic and banks' speci¯c characteristics.
Finally, we introduce another measure of bank risk, the Z-score, which has
been widely used in the recent literature [???]. We constructed the Z-score
16as the sum of the mean of return on assets and the mean of equity-ratio
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. We apply the
natural logarithm to the Z-score, since it is highly skewed. This measure
represents the number of standard deviations that a banks rate of return of
assets has to fall for the bank to become insolvent [?]. In other words, the
Z-score measures the distance from insolvency [?]. Therefore, the Z-score is
represented as the inverse of the probability of insolvency. A higher Z-score
suggests a lower probability of bank insolvency.
The speci¯cation is presented as follows:
Z-scoreit = ®¢Z-scorei;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (7)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + '¢Selict¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½¢Selict¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ ¢Selict¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
where ¢z-score is the natural logarithm of the z-score measure of bank i at
time t.
We estimate the regression using monetary policy dummies for additional
results. We want to verify whether the e®ect of monetary policy changes,
represented by the dummies Up and Down, are statistically signi¯cant and
whether the coe±cient is positive or negative. The speci¯cation to be tested
is:
Z-scoreit = ®¢Z-scorei;t¡1 + ¯Sizei;t¡1 + °Capi;t¡1 + ±Liqt¡1 (8)
+ Ã¢IPt¡1 + 'Dummyt¡1 + ¿Ownershipi;t
+ ½Dummyt¡1 ¤ Ownershipi;t + %Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ÀCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 + &Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1
+ ³Sizei;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ ÂCapi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t
+ #Liqi;t¡1 ¤ Dummyt¡1 ¤ Crisisi;t + ·Crisisi;t + "i;t
We expect the coe±cient of dummy Up to be negative, indicating that the
e®ect of monetary policy tightening on bank risk taking is positive. On the
17other hand, we expect the result to be inverse when considering the dummy
Down.
4 Data
We collect data from monthly reports that banks have to present to the
Central Bank of Brazil, which provides information on ¯nancial statements
for ¯nancial institutions. We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel
with 5183 observations. We identify 99 banks for which income statements
and balance sheets detailed data are provided from January 2003 to February
2009. We focus on commercial banks that engage in loan operations.
We use data from bank consolidated accounts (bank conglomerates) and
from unconsolidated accounts for individual banks. If banks merge or are
acquired we use consolidated data for the acquiring bank and the acquired
bank is not included in the data after that. The bank ownership information
is obtained from the Brazilian Central Bank database.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the
analysis. Loans correspond to the annual growth rate of lending in Brazilian
banks. Non Performing Loans are loans that are in default or close to being
in default k. NPL are the ratio between the Non Performing Loans and total
loans, measured in percentage. Total Assets will be used as a proxy for the
size of the banks. Equity over assets ratio will be used as a control variable
in the regressions. Selic is the Banco Central do Brasil's overnight lending.
We also employ the Z-score, the sum of the mean of return on assets and
the mean of equity-ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on
assets.
< Place Table 1 About Here >
The ¯nancial crisis of 2008/2009 had a signi¯cant impact over Brazilian
credit and external accounts. Companies that speculated in the exchange rate
derivatives market presented losses, even though, there was no capital °ight.
The Brazilian economy was able to partially contain the e®ects of the crisis
due to the high international reserves. In addition, the Central Bank was also
able to reduce interest rates. However, the damage caused by the turbulence
kThey are de¯ned as loans that are past due for 90 days or more, but have not been
completely written o®
18in the Brazilian economy appeared in October, 2008. Companies promoted
collective vacations, postponed investments and held o® from undertakings.
Figure 1 shows Brazilian' credit growth for di®erent ¯nancial institutions,
revealing that state-owned banks were more sensitive to changes in credit
during the ¯nancial crisis.
< Place Fig.1 About Here >
In the recent period, Brazilian banks increased their provisions of non-
performing loans in order to prevent against the possible e®ects of the crisis
in the US subprime market. Figure 2 presents the non performing loans for
state-owned, private and foreign banks. From this ¯gure we can see that the
dynamics of NPLs is heterogenous across bank type.
< Place Fig.2 About Here >
5 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results for the impacts of monetary policy
changes on lending activity in order to sustain the existence of a bank lending
channel. Subsequently, we present evidence suggesting that low interest rates
increase banks' risk-taking.
5.1 Bank Lending Channel
The results of Equation (1) are summarized in Table 2. The size, the cap-
italization and the liquidity e®ect are positive, suggesting that large, well-
capitalized and liquid banks in Brazil are more tempted to expand their loan
portfolio. We also test the e®ect of monetary policy changes on loan growth.
The response of bank lending to a monetary policy shock is negative. When
Selic increases, banks reduce their lending activity. This happens mainly
because during monetary tightening banks opt to lend to the government,
who pays more, rather than lend to consumers. The higher the Selic, the
more expansive is the credit o®ered to consumers, since there is less money
available in the economy. Industrial Production (IP) a®ects positively loans.
A higher level of industrial production increases the loan growth. The in-
teraction between Size/Cap and monetary policy (Selic) have positive sign.
19Larger and well-capitalized banks are better able to bu®er their lending dur-
ing monetary policy shocks, which is in line with the bank lending channel
literature. Larger banks and well-capitalized banks can mitigate the e®ect
of shocks as they can have access to other funding sources such as interbank
lending/borrowing or retail/wholesale funding. Moreover, the e®ects of these
interactions are more pronounced during the crisis period, characterized by
the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Column (3) also shows that monetary policy has di®erent e®ects over
state-owned, foreign and private domestic banks. State-owned banks are the
ones more a®ected by monetary policy changes. One explanation could be
that, during the observed period, state-owned banks have increased their
payroll loans to state-owned employees. The payroll loans, characterized by
personal loans with interests payments directly deducted from the borrowers'
payroll check, brings bene¯ts to both borrowers and lenders. It is safer for
lenders since the payment is automatic and the responsibility belongs to the
union. Thus, it brings bene¯ts to the borrowers since it reduces their work to
go to the bank or do the job manually. State-owned banks presented a strong
credit growth recorded in payroll and mortgages in 2009. The payroll loans
were favored by downward movements in the interest rates and by regulatory
changes that increased the margin of retirees and pensioners of the National
Institute of Social Security (INSS). In turn, concerning the mortgages, there
was an increase in resources of the savings account and in the Guarantee
Fund for Length Service (FGTS) ¤¤.
< Place Table 2 About Here >
We also test for the e®ects of monetary policy over lending. Table 3
presents the results of how changes in the interest rates a®ect the credit
growth, regarding the estimation of Equation (2). During periods of tighten-
ing monetary policy, banks reduce their loans. In contrast, during periods of
loosening monetary policy, banks increase their loans. Those results of tight-
ening and loosing monetary policy are in accordance with Nier and Zicchino
[2008] and Kashyap and Stein [2000]. However, our results show that the ef-
fects of tightening and loosing policy are not of similar magnitude. Dummy
Down, representing decreases in the interest rates, presents a stronger e®ect
over loan growth. The two e®ects are statistically di®erent from each other
¤¤Financial Stability Report - October of 2009
20in absolute terms, which suggests evidence for asymmetric e®ects. Which is
expected since we used monthly observations.
This ¯nding clari¯es the existence of a bank lending channel, which is a
particular case of the broad credit channel [Kashyap and Stein, 1994] due
to its emphasis on just one source of external ¯nancing, the supply of bank
loans, in the monetary policy transmission. During expansionary monetary
policy, the interest rate decreases leading to an increase in the supply of
credit [Bernanke, 1993]. [Disyatat, 2010] adds to this discussion by attesting
that tight monetary policy is assumed to drain deposits from the system and,
therefore, reduce lending if banks face frictions in issuing uninsured liabilities
to replace the shortfall in deposits. Additionally, much of the driving force
behind bank lending is attributed to policy-induced quantitative changes on
the liability structure of bank balance sheets.
Furthermore, Table 3 shows how monetary policy a®ect loan growth in a
di®erent way depending on banks' size, capitalization and liquidity. During
monetary policy tightening larger banks expand their lending activity. Again,
in line with the result that larger banks are better able to bu®er their lending
during monetary policy shocks. This e®ect is more pronounced during the
¯nancial crisis for capitalized and liquid banks. State-owned banks rise their
lending in periods where the interest rates increase. Therefore, state-owned
banks are more sensitive to monetary policy changes in the period analyzed.
Policymakers must take this into account when formulating monetary policy.
On the other hand, in periods of crisis when interest rates decrease, well-
capitalized banks decrease their lending activity.
< Place Table 3 About Here >
Table 4 reinforces the results of Table 2 presenting the determinants of
loans for annual observations, i.e., the independent variables were constructed
as the mean of each bank for each year. The results are similar to the ones
presented before. Size, Capitalization and Liquidity in°uence positively loan
growth. On the other hand, Selic impacts negatively loan growth, i.e., when
Selic increases/decreses banks reduce/increase their lending activity. Foreign
banks have a higher loan activity if compared to public and private domestic
banks. However, state-owned banks are more sensitive to monetary policy
shocks. The interactions of Selic with banks' speci¯c characteristics give
support to the bank lending channel. Larger and well-capitalized banks are
better able to bu®er their lending during monetary policy shocks. And again
these impacts are more pronounced during the ¯nancial crisis.
21< Place Table 4 About Here >
In Table 5, we present the results of the estimation of Equation (2) us-
ing annual data. These results show that the estimations do not change
much from the ones presented with monthly observations in Table 3. Using
the average of the independent variables we can verify the presence of the
bank lending channel. Lending increase/decrease during periods of loosen-
ing/tightening monetary policy. Furthermore, the interactions with mone-
tary policy dummies and banks' speci¯c characteristics are signi¯cant, inten-
sifying the assumption of the bank lending channel. And, even though we
present annual observations, the coe±cients of tightening and loosing policy
are not of similar magnitude. Which brings evidence for asymmetric e®ects.
< Place Table 5 About Here >
In all regressions presented above, the time dummies for the period from
October 2008 to February 2009 are all negative and statistically signi¯cant.
They account for the absorption of the global shock that has hit the US and
the rest of the world after the failure of Lehman Brothers. Our empirical




Non Performing Loans are loans that are in default or close to being in de-
fault. Table 6 presents the results of Equation (3), revealing the sensitivity
of non performing loans (NPL) to monetary shocks. Empirical suggests that
NPL are persistent as the coe±cient on lagged NPL is statistically signi¯-
cant. The coe±cient of the Selic interest rates presents the expected sign. In-
creases/decreases in interest rates imply in increases/decreases in the growth
rate of NPL.
We also control for ownership in this speci¯cation and ¯nd that the own-
ership dummies are statistically signi¯cant, with state-owned banks having
a lower NPL on average if compared to private domestic and foreign banks.
In fact, if we take a look to the average NPL of public banks we will ¯nd
that this ¯nancial institution presents the lower average (0.0131). Private do-
mestic and foreign banks presents an average, respectively, of 0.0164 0.0137.
22This may be due to the fact that state-owned banks have a lower exposure
to credit risk if compared to their private counterparts.
Moreover, Column (2) presents the results of di®erent reactions to mon-
etary policy shocks depending on banks' speci¯c characteristics. Larger and
well-capitalized are more a®ected by changes in the Selic. When Selic in-
creases larger and well-capitalized banks reduce the growth rate of NPL.
Likewise, these e®ects were more pronounced during the ¯nancial crisis, since
the crisis a®ects positively the NPL.
< Place Table 6 About Here >
Table 7 illustrates the e®ects of monetary policy on non-performing loans
by estimating Equation (4). In periods in which interest rates have increased,
banks increased their NPL. Monetary tightening may aggravate the situation
of banks since increases their NPL participation. On the other hand, mone-
tary loosing may contribute to banks' performance; when interest rates de-
crease, banks decrease their NPL. The e®ects of tightening and loosing policy
are not of similar magnitude. The dummy for decreases in interest rates have
a stronger e®ect, suggesting that there is asymmetry in these e®ects.
The results point to di®erent reactions of the NPL depending on banks'
speci¯c characteristics. Liquid banks decrease the growth rate of NPL during
monetary tightening. In contrast, during monetary loosing, large banks in-
crease the growth rate of NPL. Furthermore, during the ¯nancial crisis, when
the interest rates have increased, well-capitalized and liquid banks increase
their growth rate of NPL, while larger banks decrease this rate. Again, crisis
plays an important role in determining the growth rate of NPL.
< Place Table 7 About Here >
We use the mean of the variables for each year in order to analyze the
e®ects of monetary policy over the year and compare with the results for each
month observation. Table 8 shows these results for NPL. We ¯nd consistency
in our results. Selic presents a positive signi¯cant sign. State-owned banks
have a lower NPL if compared to other banks. And ¯nally, our results point
to di®erent reactions to monetary policy shocks depending on banks' speci¯c
characteristics.
< Place Table 8 About Here >
23By including the dummies of monetary policy we can verify very similar
e®ects for annual observations. During periods of monetary policy tighten-
ing/loosing, NPL increases/decreases. State-owned banks are more sensitive
to monetary policy changes, since its coe±cient is signi¯cant. In addition,
we ¯nd signi¯cant interactions of monetary policy dummies with banks' spe-
ci¯c characteristics. Including new variables in each column does not change
much the results of the earlier variables, which justi¯es robust results. This
results can be seen in Table 9.
< Place Table 9 About Here >
5.2.2 Credit Risk Exposure
The ¯nancial crisis arose the discussion concerning the existence of a risk
taking channel, characterized by changes in banks' risk tolerance due to ex-
pansive monetary policy. There are three main ways in which such risk-
taking channel may be operative. A ¯rst set of e®ects operates through
the impact of interest rates on valuations, incomes and cash °ows, acting
like a ¯nancial accelerator. Furthermore, these e®ects can be applied to the
widespread use of Value-at-Risk methodologies for economic and regulatory
capital [Danielsson et al., 2004]. A second set of e®ects operates through the
relationship between market rates and target rates of return, the so-called
\search for yield" [Rajan, 2005]. Low interest rates may create incentives to
asset managers to take on more risks, because of some behavioral features
such as money illusion or bad adjustment after times of prosperity. Finally,
it can operate through aspects concerning characteristics of the communica-
tion policies, such as transparency and insurance, which together with the
reaction function of the central bank, may change the risk taking behavior
[Diamond and Rajan, 2009].
Banks' speci¯c characteristics are important determinants of Risk. We
¯nd that Size and Liquidity have a positive relation with Risk. Large and
liquid banks presents a higher credit risk exposure. On the other hand,
we ¯nd that well-capitalized banks have a lower risk exposure. Selic has a
negative impact on Risk. When Selic increases, banks take less credit risk,
which is expected. This result can be explained by the reduction in lending
during periods of monetary tightening. The interaction term, NPL versus
Selic, account for losses. Changes in the Selic a®ects the exposure of credit
risk depending on the level of the NPL rate. The interactions with Selic
24shows that monetary policy has di®erent e®ects depending on banks' size,
level of capitalization and liquidity.
Additionally, in the risk taking channel there are some statistical di®er-
ences between banks, due to ownership. When there are changes in the Selic
interest rates, state-owned banks increased their loans participation in total
assets, which suggests that they have increased their share relative to private
domestic banks. We found positive coe±cients for this interaction.
The ¯nancial crisis exhibits a negative in°uence over credit risk exposure.
This might be due to the incredibility that was passed on by the ¯nancial
crisis. Just before the ¯nancial crisis disclosure, owners of stocks in U.S.
corporations had su®ered enormous losses. The ¯nancial crisis halted global
credit markets, jeopardizing the ¯nancial stability of the economy worldwide.
Even though governments and central banks have adopted measures to con-
tain the crisis, what our results might suggest is that the crisis have reduced
bank risk taking in this period. These results are provided in Table 10, which
presents the results of the estimation of Equation (5).
< Place Table 10 About Here >
Table 11 presents the results of Equation (6). Monetary policy changes
a®ect credit risk exposure. Higher interest rates reduce banks' credit risk
exposure. On the other hand, low interest rates contribute to increase banks'
risk-taking. Speci¯cally, monetary tightening have a stronger e®ect over
credit risk exposure. Again, we have evidences for asymmetric e®ects. When
interest rates decrease, banks shift to more riskier operations with higher rate
of return. With this ¯nding we con¯rm the existence of a risk-taking channel
in Brazil's economy. Unusually low interest rates during an extended period
of time leads to an increase in banks' risk taking [Altunbas et al., 2009c].
Therefore, this period of low interest rates may encourage banks to soften
their lending standards, as proposed by Jimenez et al. [2007], amplifying the
e®ectiveness of the risk-taking channel.
Considering the ownership control, our results suggest that foreign banks
take on more credit risk. In addition, we tested for a more detailed e®ect of
monetary policy over banks' speci¯c characteristics. We found that during
monetary loosing, large and well-capitalized banks reduce their credit risk
exposure. Furthermore, the ¯nancial crisis a®ected negatively the risk taking.
< Place Table 11 About Here >
25Table 12 illustrates the determinants of Z-score yy as presented in equation
(7). We interpret the results very cautiously. The coe±cient of Selic is
negative and statistically signi¯cant, suggesting that the e®ect of Selic on
bank risk taking is positive and signi¯cant. A higher estimated Z-score mean
more stability, i.e., less risk taking. Therefore, a higher Selic should imply in
higher levels of bank risk taking. In addition, our results point that larger
and well-capitalized banks seems to present lower levels of bank risk taking.
We also ¯nd that, during monetary policy shocks, well-capitalized banks
appear to present higher levels of bank risk taking. Once again, this e®ect is
intensi¯ed during the ¯nancial crisis. Moreover, the ¯nancial crisis actually
seems to increase the levels of bank risk taking.
< Place Table 12 About Here >
Finally, Table 13 presents the results of Z-score including monetary policy
dummies as presented in Equation (8). Again, we verify consistency in our
results. The coe±cient of monetary policy tightening is negative, suggesting
that its e®ect on bank risk taking is positive and signi¯cant. This intensi¯es
the assumption earlier presented that a higher estimated Z-score mean more
stability, i.e., less risk taking. The result is inverse when considering the
dummy for monetary policy loosing. Several interactions with monetary pol-
icy dummies and banks' speci¯c characteristics are presented. The ¯nancial
crisis seems to increase the levels of bank risk taking.
< Place Table 13 About Here >
5.3 Robustness Check
Overall, the empirical results imply that both the bank lending and risk-
taking channels are operational in Brazil. These results are robust to periods
of distress as the one we have witnessed recently after the recent global crisis
that was originated in the credit market of the US.
We also run all regressions using the Least Squares Dummy Variable
(LSDV) with Bias Correction for Dynamic Panel (LSDVC) estimator due
to ?, which has expanded the LSDV bias approximations in ? to unbal-
anced panels. Qualitative results remain the same, which suggests that the
yyWe applied the Hausman test and the result suggested the use of ¯xed e®ects
26bias is small in our case as expected due to the large number of time peri-
ods and large number of banks. Furthermore, as tested, our regressions are
heteroscedastic. Therefore, FGLS is adequate in our case.
An additional problem that could a®ect our results is that the bank con-
trol variables could be endogenous in our speci¯cations. We also run these
regressions without the control variables and ¯nd similar results but small
changes in the coe±cients, which may suggest omitted variable bias. There-
fore, we present the results with these control variables.
6 Final Considerations
The current credit crisis has shown the important role of monetary policy
in assuring ¯nancial stability. We analyze the role of monetary policy by
accessing a detailed database of Brazil during the period of 2003-2009. As
expected, high interest rates reduce lending, and low interest rates increase
lending. This ¯nding clari¯es the existence of a bank lending channel. More-
over, banks change their lending strategy in accordance with the direction of
monetary policy.
It is interesting to notice how di®erent banks react to monetary policy
changes. State-owned banks seem to respond more than foreign and private
banks to increases and decreases in interest rates. This might be due to the
strong credit growth recorded in payroll loans and mortgages, or the in°uence
that politics plays in the lending decisions of state-owned banks. Studies have
shown that state-owned banks have increased their lending during elections.
As a result, several state-owned banks have increased their loan portfolio
over the years. This suggests that attention should be paid when conducting
monetary policy, since state-owned banks can be more sensitive to interest
rates changes.
We also study the impacts of monetary policy over non-performing loans.
The results may indicate that monetary policy changes can aggravate or alle-
viate banks' performance. During periods of interest rates increasing, banks
present a higher credit exposure, which may aggravate their performance.
During periods of interest rates decreasing their relation is reversed. In ad-
dition, we shed light on the di®erent impacts on state-owned, foreign and
private domestic banks. State-owned banks present a lower amount of non-
performing loans compared to other banks. Consequently, state-owned banks
present a di®erent lending pro¯le.
27Finally, our results support the idea that lower monetary policy rates
increase the banks' risk-taking. Banking supervisors should be very careful
during periods of extremely low interest rates, in order to mitigate possible
lending shocks. Controlling for bank's characteristics, we found that banks
react di®erently when interest rates change depending on the size, level of
capitalization and liquidity that the bank presents. Additionally, foreign
banks have increased their loans participation in total assets, which suggests
that they have increased their share relative to the other banks.
The 2007-2008 ¯nancial crisis has revealed that the economy perception
of risk is crucial to determine the bank access to capital. Moreover, the crisis
has shown that banking losses can lead to critical credit conditions and as a
result impose severe costs to the economy. Monetary policies are shown to be
able to o®set the consequences of ¯nancial instabilities. Therefore, we ¯nd
a empirical consistent relationship between monetary policy and ¯nancial
stability. Further research could explore how the market structure a®ects
the impacts of monetary policy on bank lending.
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32Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Sd Min Max
Loans* 8150.85 23505 0.7239 242000
Non Performing Loans* 120.17 354.34 0.0000 4836.72
NPL 0.02 0.0265 0.0000 0.3577
Assets* 18955 51509 15.41 500000
Equity* 1937.98 5057.45 -1.9957 50722
Equity Ratio 0.1882 0.1267 -0.1272 0.8835
¢Selic -0.0742 0.2476 -0.5046 0.3594
Z-score 4.28 1.07 .6860 9.77
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Loans correspond to the annual growth
rate of lending in Brazilian banks. Non Performing Loans are the loans in default or close to being in default. NPL are
the ratio between the Non Performing Loans and the Loans, measured in percentage. Assets are the size of the Brazilian
banks. Equity is the total assets minus total liabilities. Equity Ratio is the owner's equity divided by the total assets.
Selic is the variation of Banco Central do Brasil's overnight lending year over year. Z-score is the bank's return on assets
plus the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns.
* In million of Brazilian reais
33Table 2: The Determinants of Loan Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Loanst Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ Loanst¡1 0.0554*** 0.0578*** 0.0738***
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0141)
Sizet¡1 0.00150*** 0.00144*** 0.00147***
(0.000364) (0.000366) (0.000352)
Capt¡1 0.00668*** 0.00609*** 0.00634***
(0.00156) (0.00169) (0.00164)
Liqt¡1 0.00431*** 0.00533*** 0.00552***
(0.000732) (0.000880) (0.000907)
¢ IPt¡1 0.00249** 0.00251** 0.00254**
(0.00102) (0.00101) (0.00106)
















Sizet¡1*¢ Selict¡1 * Crisis -0.0248***
(0.00425)
Capt¡1*¢ Selict¡1 * Crisis -0.241***
(0.0361)




Constant -0.00479 -0.00418 -0.00828
(0.00657) (0.00653) (0.00635)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 5140 5140 5140
Number of banks 99 99 99
AR(1) 0.1537 0.1505 0.1276
Wald 138.4*** 144.1*** 321.6***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 1.8 ¢105*** 1.7 ¢105*** 4.3 ¢105***
This table presents the variables that a®ect loan growth and the results for public, foreign and private banks. We also
include NPLt¡1 in the regression but it was not statistically signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress our baseline model. In
Column (2) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (3) we add
the interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1).
For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables
are presented with one lag. We also add the Selic with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant.
The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are
provided in parenthesis.
34Table 3: The E®ects of Monetary Policy on Loan Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Loanst Baseline Ownership Interaction Baseline Dummy Interaction
¢ Loanst¡1 0.0619*** 0.0638*** 0.0696*** 0.0629*** 0.0655*** 0.0603***
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Sizet¡1 0.00137*** 0.00131*** 0.00116*** 0.00139*** 0.00133*** 0.00139***
(0.000361) (0.000363) (0.000370) (0.000360) (0.000362) (0.000364)
Capt¡1 0.00634*** 0.00571*** 0.00681*** 0.00638*** 0.00571*** 0.00606***
(0.00155) (0.00169) (0.00163) (0.00155) (0.00168) (0.00169)
Liqt¡1 0.00437*** 0.00539*** 0.00512*** 0.00436*** 0.00539*** 0.00539***
(0.000731) (0.000881) (0.000863) (0.000730) (0.000880) (0.000881)
¢ IPt¡1 0.00234** 0.00237** 0.00224** 0.00236** 0.00239** 0.00258**
(0.00102) (0.00101) (0.000922) (0.00101) (0.00100) (0.00101)
Upt¡1 -0.00440*** -0.00422*** -0.0323**
(0.00150) (0.00148) (0.0132)
State-Owned -0.00273 -0.00406** -0.00281* -0.00282*
(0.00166) (0.00172) (0.00166) (0.00166)
Foreign 0.00232 0.00249 0.00235 0.00239















Constant -0.00168 -0.00113 0.00536 -0.00419 -0.00358 -0.00409
(0.00653) (0.00650) (0.00671) (0.00652) (0.00648) (0.00652)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5140 5140 5140 5140 5140 5140
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99
AR(1) 0.1490 0.1462 0.1398 0.1487 0.1452 0.1475
Wald 134.9*** 140.3*** 241.2*** 133.4*** 139.8*** 154.4***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 1.9 ¢105*** 1.9 ¢105*** 1.3 ¢106*** 2.0 ¢105*** 1.9 ¢105*** 1.8 ¢105***
This table presents the results of how changes in monetary policy a®ect loan growth. More precisely, we show the results
of how changes in monetary policy a®ect loan growth in a di®erent way depending on banks' size, capitalization and
liquidity. We also include NPLt¡1 and the dummy neutral in the regression but they were not statistically signi¯cant.
In Column (1) we regress our baseline model with the dummy Upt¡1. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model
adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (3) we add the interactions. In Column (4) we
regress our baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1. In Column (5) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies
for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (6) we add the interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator,
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1). For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for
groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies with more
lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
35Table 4: The Determinants of Loan Growth - Average
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Loanst Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ Loanst¡1 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.118**
(0.0502) (0.0529) (0.0548)
Sizet¡1 0.0148*** 0.0156*** 0.0218***
(0.00483) (0.00508) (0.00503)
Capt¡1 0.0346 0.0503** 0.0792***
(0.0225) (0.0247) (0.0250)
Liqt¡1 0.0458*** 0.0565*** 0.0707***
(0.0116) (0.0152) (0.0185)
¢ IPt¡1 0.0977*** 0.103*** 0.0857
(0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0822)
























Constant -0.169* -0.168* -0.187**
(0.0886) (0.0908) (0.0950)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 325 325 325
Number of banco 76 76 76
AR(1) 0.1711 0.1751 0.3900
Wald 196.5 182.4 313.0
Modi¯ed Wald Test 2.9 ¢105*** 1.4 ¢109*** 5.3 ¢109***
This table presents the average of the variables that a®ect loan growth and the results for public, foreign and private
banks. We also include NPLt¡1 in the regression but it was not statistically signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress our
baseline model. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign.
In Column (3) we add to the baseline model the interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1). For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise
heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add the Selic with more lags but the
results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
36Table 5: The E®ects of Monetary Policy on Loan Growth - Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Loanst Baseline Ownership Interaction Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ Loanst¡1 0.296*** 0.248*** 0.344*** 0.423*** 0.355*** 0.357***
(0.0514) (0.0541) (0.0501) (0.0474) (0.0534) (0.0498)
Sizet¡1 0.0163*** 0.0189*** -0.00555 0.00750* 0.0103** 0.0351***
(0.00506) (0.00539) (0.00682) (0.00405) (0.00457) (0.00593)
Capt¡1 0.0374* 0.0623** -0.0347 -0.00203 0.0188 0.127***
(0.0217) (0.0242) (0.0369) (0.0186) (0.0213) (0.0290)
Liqt¡1 0.0422*** 0.0517*** 0.0476*** 0.0305*** 0.0425*** 0.0757***
(0.0126) (0.0167) (0.0177) (0.0103) (0.0146) (0.0178)
¢ IPt¡1 0.128*** 0.127*** -0.207*** -0.00834 -0.00818 -0.144***
(0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0374) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0366)
Upt¡1 -0.0677*** -0.0650*** -0.354**
(0.0188) (0.0184) (0.171)
State-Owned 0.0234 -0.0925*** 0.00996 -0.0658**
(0.0262) (0.0292) (0.0217) (0.0258)
Foreign 0.0536* 0.0447 0.0514** 0.0438*





























Constant -0.0329 -0.0485 0.144 -0.108 -0.122 -0.293***
(0.0862) (0.0926) (0.121) (0.0735) (0.0803) (0.102)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 325 325 325 325 325 325
Number of banks 76 76 76 76 76 76
AR(1) 0.1705 0.2537 0.0294 -0.1134 0.0533 0.0582
Wald 396.0*** 349.3*** 190.6*** 138.0*** 90.93*** 559.4***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 2.1 ¢106*** 2.3 ¢108*** 1.6 ¢108*** 1.6 ¢105*** 7.7 ¢106*** 1.5 ¢105***
This table presents the results of how changes in monetary policy a®ect loan growth. More precisely, we show the results
of how changes in monetary policy a®ect loan growth in a di®erent way depending on banks' size, capitalization and
liquidity. We also include NPLt¡1 and the dummy neutral in the regression but they were not statistically signi¯cant.
In Column (1) we regress our baseline model with the dummy Upt¡1. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model
adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (3) we add the interactions. In Column (4) we
regress our baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1. In Column (5) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies
for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (6) we add the interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator,
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1). For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for
groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies with more
lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
37Table 6: Determinants of NPL
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ¢ NPLt Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ NPLt¡1 -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.161***
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0151)




















Constant 0.0131*** 0.0158*** 0.0129**
(0.00373) (0.00523) (0.00544)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 5155 5155 5140
Number of banks 99 99 99
AR(1) 0.0398 0.0398 0.0732
Wald 125.4*** 129.4*** 188.0***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 5.0 ¢107*** 4.2 ¢107*** 4.3 ¢107***
This table presents the variables that a®ect NPL and the results for public, foreign and private banks. We also include
Loanst¡1, Sizet¡1, Capt¡1, Liqt¡1, ¢ Selict*Public/Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically





. In Column (1) we regress our baseline model. In Column (2) we
add to the baseline model the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (3) we add the interactions. The
method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1). For heteroskedasticity
we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are presented with one lag.
We also add the Selic with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for
statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
38Table 7: The e®ects of monetary policy on NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ¢ NPLt Baseline Ownership Interaction Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ NPLt¡1 -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.131*** -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.154***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0150)
Upt¡1 0.0442*** 0.0440*** 0.972***
(0.00848) (0.00854) (0.288)
State-Owned -0.0132* -0.00879 -0.0129* -0.0138
(0.00748) (0.00819) (0.00704) (0.00920)
Foreign 0.000185 0.00102 0.000395 0.00694



















Constant -0.0178*** -0.0143*** -0.0201*** 0.000465 0.00408 0.0139**
(0.00378) (0.00502) (0.00543) (0.00407) (0.00523) (0.00609)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5155 5155 5140 5155 5155 5140
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99
AR(1) 0.0864 0.0860 0.0330 0.0917 0.0903 0.0682
Wald 215.3*** 217.8*** 183.6*** 206.3*** 208.6*** 174.9***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 6.5 ¢107*** 6.2 ¢107*** 5.7 ¢107*** 7.0 ¢107*** 6.6 ¢107*** 4.0 ¢107***
This table presents the results of how changes in monetary policy a®ect NPL. We also include Loanst¡1, Sizet¡1,
Capt¡1, DummyUp=Down ¤ Public=Foreign, and the dummy neutral in the regression but they were not statistically





. In Column (1) we regress our baseline model with the dummy
Upt¡1. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column
(3) we add the interactions. In Column (4) we regress our baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1. In Column
(5) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (6) we add the
interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1).
For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables
are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant.
The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are
provided in parenthesis.
39Table 8: Determinants of NPL - Average
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ¢ NPLt Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ NPLt¡1 -0.138*** -0.131*** -0.131***
(0.0458) (0.0442) (0.0487)




















Constant 0.0492** 0.0831*** 0.0806*
(0.0203) (0.0263) (0.0444)
Time Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 323 323 323
Number of banks 75 75 75
AR(1) 0.1742 0.1389 0.0819
Wald 93.48*** 110.4*** 111.6***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 1.0 ¢107*** 1.1 ¢1010*** 2.1 ¢1011***
This table presents the variables that a®ect NPL and the results for public, foreign and private banks. We also include
Loanst¡1, Sizet¡1, Capt¡1, Liqt¡1, ¢ Selict*Public/Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically





. In Column (1) we regress our baseline model. In Column (2) we
add to the baseline model the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (3) we add the interactions. The
method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1). For heteroskedasticity
we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables are presented with one lag.
We also add the Selic with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for
statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
40Table 9: The e®ects of monetary policy on NPL - Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: ¢ NPLt Baseline Ownership Interaction Baseline Ownership Interaction
¢ NPLt¡1 -0.0958* -0.107** -0.118** -0.0958* -0.107** -0.121***
(0.0502) (0.0498) (0.0484) (0.0502) (0.0498) (0.0407)
Upt¡1 0.193*** 0.199*** 0.550**
(0.0348) (0.0373) (0.249)
State-Owned -0.133*** -0.130** -0.133*** -0.108**
(0.0377) (0.0514) (0.0377) (0.0444)
Foreign 0.0207 0.0435 0.0207 -0.0157



























Constant -0.0916*** -0.0732** 0.00352 0.102*** 0.126*** 0.159***
(0.0278) (0.0320) (0.0312) (0.0215) (0.0269) (0.0407)
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
Number of banks 75 75 75 75 75 75
AR(1) 0.0883 0.0690 0.0690 0.0883 0.0690 0.0730
Wald 40.35*** 48.27*** 81.89*** 40.35*** 48.27*** 194.8***
Modi¯ed Wald Test 1.2 ¢1012*** 6.0 ¢109*** 4.1 ¢106*** 1.2 ¢1012*** 6.0 ¢109*** 3.9 ¢107***
This table presents the results of how changes in monetary policy a®ect NPL. We also include Loanst¡1, Sizet¡1,
Capt¡1, Crisis, DummyUp=Down ¤ Public=Foreign, and the dummy neutral in the regression but they were not





. In Column (1) we regress our baseline model with the
dummy Upt¡1. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign.
In Column (3) we add the interactions. In Column (4) we regress our baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1. In
Column (5) we regress the baseline model adding the dummies for ownership, Public and Foreign. In Column (6) we add
the interactions. The method used was the FGLS estimator, corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (AR1).
For heteroskedasticity we used the Modi¯ed Wald Test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. The independent variables
are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant.
The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are
provided in parenthesis.
41Table 10: Determinants of Credit Risk Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Riskt Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction
Sizet¡1 0.0197*** 0.0373*** 0.0197*** 0.0373***
(0.00418) (0.00527) (0.00455) (0.00619)
Capt¡1 -0.0229*** -0.0131* -0.0229** -0.0131
(0.00674) (0.00708) (0.0105) (0.00975)
Liqt¡1 0.0248*** 0.0188*** 0.0248*** 0.0188***
(0.00370) (0.00377) (0.00880) (0.00705)
¢ Selict¡1 -0.102** -0.956* -0.102** -0.956*
(0.0509) (0.572) (0.0506) (0.548)
¢ NPLt¡1*¢ Selict¡1 -9.250** -9.250**
(3.600) (4.009)
¢ Selict¡1 * State-Owned 0.272* 0.272**
(0.154) (0.108)
¢ Selict¡1 * Foreign -0.139 -0.139
(0.140) (0.171)
Sizet¡1*¢ Selict¡1 0.0481* 0.0481*
(0.0287) (0.0275)
Capt¡1*¢ Selict¡1 0.0832** 0.0832*
(0.0414) (0.0467)
Liqt¡1*¢ Selict¡1 -0.116** -0.116
(0.0546) (0.0906)
Crisis*Sizet¡1*¢ Selict¡1 -0.0587 -0.0587
(0.0830) (0.0532)
Crisis*Capt¡1*¢ Selict¡1 -0.0453 -0.0453
(0.254) (0.136)




Constant -0.456*** -0.832*** -0.456*** -0.832***
(0.0864) (0.109) (0.104) (0.139)
Fixed E®ects FE FE FE Cluster FE Cluster
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 5239 5140 5239 5140
R2 0.020 0.044 0.020 0.044
Number of banks 99 99 99 99
F statistic 20.52*** 4.244*** 10.67*** 5.610***
This table presents the variables that a®ect Risk and the results for state-owned, private and foreign banks. Risk is
represented as the ratio between total Loans and total Assets. We also include Riskt¡1, NPLt¡1, Loanst¡1, and
State ¡ Owned=Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress the
baseline model using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects.
In Column (3) we regress the same baseline model using ¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (4) we regress the baseline model
with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects cluster . The method used was the OLS estimator. The independent variables are
presented with one lag. We also add Selic with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols
***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in
parenthesis.
42Table 11: The E®ects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: ¢ Riskt Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction
Sizet¡1 0.0241*** 0.0262*** 0.0247*** 0.0296*** 0.0241*** 0.0262*** 0.0247*** 0.0296***
(0.00439) (0.00446) (0.00443) (0.00463) (0.00445) (0.00446) (0.00473) (0.00529)
Capt¡1 -0.0200*** -0.0205*** -0.0196*** -0.0129* -0.0200* -0.0205* -0.0196* -0.0129
(0.00676) (0.00684) (0.00677) (0.00731) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.00997)
Liqt¡1 0.0240*** 0.0200*** 0.0242*** 0.0238*** 0.0240*** 0.0200*** 0.0242*** 0.0238***
(0.00368) (0.00373) (0.00368) (0.00368) (0.00878) (0.00754) (0.00879) (0.00868)
Upt¡1 -0.0122** -0.0173*** -0.0122* -0.0173**
(0.00525) (0.00555) (0.00680) (0.00767)
¢ NPLt¡1*Upt¡1 -0.567** -0.567*
(0.221) (0.308)
Downt¡1 0.00324 0.0646* 0.00324 0.0646











Constant -0.550*** -0.597*** -0.564*** -0.655*** -0.550*** -0.597*** -0.564*** -0.655***
(0.0907) (0.0922) (0.0915) (0.0955) (0.103) (0.103) (0.109) (0.120)
Fixed E®ects FE FE FE FE FE Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5239 5140 5239 5239 5239 5140 5239 5239
R2 0.035 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.032 0.035
Number of banks 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
F statistic 7.171*** 7.069*** 7.719*** 6.886*** 5.277*** 5.319*** 5.638*** 6.264***
This table presents the variables that a®ect Risk and the results for state-owned, private and foreign banks. Risk is
represented as the ratio between total Loans and total Assets. We also include Riskt¡1, NPLt¡1, Loanst¡1, and
Selict¡1*State ¡ owned=Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress
the baseline model with the dummy Upt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model with the
interactions using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (3) we regress the baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1 using ¯xed
e®ects. In Column (4) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (5) we regress
the baseline model with the dummy Upt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (6) we regress the baseline model with
the interactions using ¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (7) we regress the baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1 using
¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (8) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects cluster. The
method used was the OLS estimator. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies
with more lags but the results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
43Table 12: Determinants of Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Z-score Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction
Sizet¡1 0.734*** 0.362*** 0.734*** 0.362**
(0.0951) (0.122) (0.109) (0.138)
Capt¡1 0.987*** 0.793*** 0.987*** 0.793***
(0.177) (0.175) (0.252) (0.237)
¢Selict¡1 -10.67*** -11.39** -10.67*** -11.39**







Constant -9.634*** -2.067 -9.634*** -2.067
(1.973) (2.493) (2.245) (2.795)
Fixed E®ects FE FE FE Cluster FE Cluster
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 513 513 513 513
R2 0.195 0.300 0.195 0.300
Number of banks 99 99 99 99
F statistic 24.89*** 24.98*** 16.87*** 11.74***
This table presents the variables that a®ect risk taking. We measure bank risk using the z-score of each bank, which is
the mean of return on assets plus the mean of equity-ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. We
also include NPLt¡1, Liqt¡1, Loanst¡1 and State ¡ Owned=Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically
signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress the baseline model using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (2) we regress the baseline
model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (3) we regress the same model using ¯xed e®ects cluster. In
Column (4) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects cluster. The method used was the
OLS estimator. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add Selic with more lags but the results
were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parenthesis.
44Table 13: The E®ects of Monetary Policy on Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Z-score Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction Baseline Interaction
Sizet¡1 0.587*** 0.312** 0.587*** 0.293*** 0.587*** 0.312** 0.587*** 0.293**
(0.0928) (0.124) (0.0928) (0.112) (0.102) (0.140) (0.102) (0.127)
Capt¡1 0.860*** 0.870*** 0.860*** 0.773*** 0.860*** 0.870*** 0.860*** 0.773***
(0.177) (0.185) (0.177) (0.177) (0.250) (0.263) (0.250) (0.247)
Upt¡1 -0.537*** -0.451* -0.537*** -0.451*





Crisis 1.165*** 0.130 1.165*** 0.130
(0.148) (0.125) (0.218) (0.137)
Downt¡1 0.537*** 0.541** 0.537*** 0.541**





Constant -6.311*** -0.839 -6.847*** -0.816 -6.311*** -0.839 -6.847*** -0.816
(1.929) (2.543) (1.934) (2.321) (2.085) (2.844) (2.103) (2.575)
Fixed E®ects FE FE FE FE FE Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513
R2 0.180 0.296 0.180 0.290 0.180 0.296 0.180 0.290
Number of banco 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
F statistic 22.45*** 24.50*** 22.45*** 23.74*** 13.47*** 12.13*** 13.47*** 10.64***
This table presents the variables that a®ect Risk and the results for state-owned, private and foreign banks. Risk is
represented as the ratio between total Loans and total Assets. We also include Riskt¡1, NPLt¡1, Loanst¡1, and
State¡owned=Foreign in the regression but they were not statistically signi¯cant. In Column (1) we regress the baseline
model with the dummy Upt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (2) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using
¯xed e®ects. In Column (3) we regress the baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (4)
we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects. In Column (5) we regress the baseline model with
the dummy Upt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (6) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using
¯xed e®ects cluster. In Column (7) we regress the baseline model with the dummy Downt¡1 using ¯xed e®ects cluster.
In Column (8) we regress the baseline model with the interactions using ¯xed e®ects cluster. The method used was the
OLS estimator. The independent variables are presented with one lag. We also add the dummies with more lags but the
results were not statistically signi¯cant. The symbols ***,**,* stand for statistical signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%










Figure 1: This ¯gure presents the credit growth (in million of Brazilian reais)









Figure 2: This ¯gure presents the ratio of Non Performing Loans over total
Loans (in million of Brazilian reais) for state-owned, private and foreign
banks from January 2003 to February 2009.
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